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government of the republic of Hawaii that those islands should be incorporated into the United States as an integral part thereof and under its sovereignty, have determined to accomplish by treaty an object so important to their mutual and permanent welfare.

To this end, the high contracting parties have conferred full powers and authority upon their respectively appointed plenipotentiaries, to wit: The President of the United States, John Sherman, Secretary of State for the United States; the President of the Republic of Hawaii, Francis March Hatch, Lorin A. Thurston and William A. Kinney.

ARTICLE I.

The Republic of Hawaii hereby cedes absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies; and it is agreed that all the territory of, and appertaining to, the Republic of Hawaii is hereby annexed to the United States of America, under the name of the Territory of Hawaii.

ARTICLE II.

The Republic of Hawaii also cedes and hereby transfers to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, government or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipments and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining.

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition, provided, that all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for civil, military or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

ARTICLE III.

Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands, all the civil, judicial and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill vacancies so occasioned.

The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may hereafter be concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands not enacted for the fulfilment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this treaty, nor contrary to the constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.

Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands, the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian

Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.

ARTICLE IV.

The public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, including the amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian postal savings bank, is hereby assumed by the government of the United States; but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed \$4,000,000. So long, however, as the existing government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued, as hereinbefore provided, said government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt.

ARTICLE V.

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States, and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

ARTICLE VI.

The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the territory of Hawaii as they shall deem necessary or proper.

ARTICLE VII.

This treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the one part, and by the President of the Republic of Hawaii, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in accordance with the constitution of the said Republic, on the other, and the ratifications hereof shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the above articles and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at the city of Washington, this 16th day of June, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven.

JOHN SHERMAN, LORIN A. THURSTON,
FRANCIS MARCH HATCH, WILLIAM A. KINNEY.

ADDRESSES DELIVERED AT THE MOHONK ARBITRATION CONFERENCE.

ADDRESS OF HON. GEORGE F. EDMUNDS, PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE.

Ladies and Gentlemen.—I need not say that I appreciate in the highest degree the kindness of your calling upon me to preside. I can see before me many gentlemen who are better suited for such duties than I am, but I am willing to do the best I can.

A year ago, when we met here, the subject of arbitration, so far as regarded government action, was almost entirely in the dark. There were vague hints that negotiations were going on with Her Majesty's government of Great Britain, the Empress of the Indies, whose jubilee is about to be celebrated, whose reign has covered a period of sixty years of wholesome Christian adminis-

tration so far as she was concerned; and it may not be wrong to say, covering a period of sixty years of large aggrandizement of the possessions of her country, sometimes gained, I fear, in a way that would not be altogether agreeable to her gracious Christian hopes and sympathies. But our Anglo-Saxon brethren are very like ourselves. It has not been sixty years since we have been engaged in aggressive extension of territory, and in the selfish attainment of what we considered to be political ends, not by means of peaceful methods, but by the sword.

Now, after a year, we come again, and the treaty which it was supposed was to be negotiated has been negotiated, has been submitted to the Senate, and is said to have failed, though I believe the seal of secrecy has not been removed. Undoubtedly, however, it is true; and so we meet now under circumstances essentially different to those of the last year. It reminds me of what one of the greatest and best of our Christian poets, Whittier, said when the first real campaign against the aggressions and wickedness of slavery failed in 1856. If I may paraphrase, I will repeat the first verse of that poem of his, written immediately after our defeat in November, 1856:

"Beneath thy skies, Mohonk,
Thy skies of sun and rain,
Around our blazing camp-fires,
We close our ranks again."

As my friend has said, we are not to be discouraged, we are to be encouraged. Senators come and senators go; it is public opinion, steadfast, persistent, intelligent, brave public opinion, that rules the world. I need hardly confine it to the civilized world, for the wildest chief in darkest Africa cannot long maintain his power except he has the support of the majority of the people over whom his government is exercised. So I say all that is needed in the end is steadfast, persistent, earnest discussion, untiring energy in all just and honest ways to persuade a still larger body of the people of the United States that arbitration is the right and the only right way to settle differences among the nations, as it is (for the course of civil law is arbitration) among private individuals in civilized states.

This treaty was inaugurated under circumstances that led enthusiastic Americans, strong-hearted patriotic people, many of them, to look upon it with suspicion. The time of its reception in the Senate of the United States was unpropitious. Her Majesty's government, only shortly before, in a persistent effort to extend her territory in the neighborhood of the republic of Venezuela, had with seeming asperity and rudeness refused the suggestion of our President that the question between Her Majesty's government and Venezuela should be settled by arbitration, and had almost flouted the idea. When President Cleveland's pronouncement came forth, a good many people were startled, and startled, I think, in the wrong direction,—for I think he did right. (Applause.) But it changed the aspect in which Lord Salisbury looked at the Venezuelan question. There was then in Europe the strain and stress which has grown to be so severe now, and everybody felt that Lord Salisbury's change of view and action might possibly have been induced by the idea that an arrangement for arbitration with the United States, to run for five years at least, would bridge over a very critical period in the history of British power and British safety. Very likely that was all imaginary; very

likely Lord Salisbury had really changed his views, and believed that arbitration was the best thing; he certainly did very soon consent to arbitrate the Venezuelan question.

And now, looking at the question how this treaty came to fail, we must take into view all the aspects that surrounded it. This to which I have now referred, as you can naturally see, would lead a good many American senators to feel that it was merely an expedient of Her Majesty's government to maintain her ascendancy in her vast possessions and carry out her policy; and thus they had a prejudice against the treaty. There were others who had a great fear in respect of the selection of arbitrators. That the king of Sweden and Norway was, in a certain important event, to be the potentate who was to select one or two of the arbitrators, seemed to some gentlemen dangerous. They felt, and felt sincerely I have no doubt, that a republican government on the west side of the Atlantic should not authorize any European king to have a voice in the selection of a possible arbitrator between ourselves and another European sovereign. I think that was a mistake, but it accounts for a certain feeling. In the great treaty of 1871 between ourselves and Great Britain, this same king was authorized, in case of a failure, to select arbitrators,—authorized, I believe, to appoint three of them,—and this very large authority was given to him with the universal acquiescence of the Senate of the United States, of our public men, and of public opinion. For this man's kingdom is situated out of the drift of European stress in politics, and this man's character is the highest. Indeed, in respect of such public acts, the strength of a sense of duty, what we call the *noblesse oblige*, would compel almost the worst sovereign to act on high ground if called upon by powerful nations to select such arbitrators.

Then there was another consideration which is a still narrower one, that had its influence. We had just had an arbitration tribunal sitting in Paris, upon the subject of the Behring Sea fisheries. Two points were involved;—one, whether we had municipal dominion over Behring Sea, and the other, whether we had private property in the seals that came to the Pribyloff Islands at certain seasons of the year for reproduction. Undoubtedly in both these points we were wrong, as I think. I suspect that President Harrison, before he engaged in the arbitration, was informed, and, perhaps believed, that we could not maintain justly and rightly either of those two propositions. I think his view, if it was his, was based upon the ground that if Behring Sea was in our municipal dominion, the Japan Sea would be, on the same principles, within the municipal dominion of Japan, the straits of the Red Sea would fall within the municipal dominions of those countries which bordered or controlled it, and that our fishermen could not even pass through the Strait of Canso to get to the Gulf of St. Lawrence,—a doctrine against public right, and that no just nation ought to stand upon. Then secondly, the question was whether we could arbitrate upon the question of private property, when common law, for a thousand years, has settled that, just as it has all questions of wild animals; and to settle it in our favor would have made her Majesty's government the proprietors of all the herring that breed on the shore along the side of Grand Manan, and we New Englanders would not have stood that at all. The question was whether it was best

to arbitrate two questions in respect to both of which we were wrong. It was certainly better to arbitrate than to fight, and so we had the arbitration. Now there were one or two gentlemen, one a very influential senator who was a member of that tribunal, who sincerely believed, I have no doubt, that we were entitled to the municipal dominion of Behring Sea, and that we had a perfect private property in the seals. This senator was very much disappointed, I suspect, that all the impartial arbitrators were against him, and the decision was against us on both those points, with a recommendation which both governments, had they carried it out fairly, would have found effectual for the preservation of the seals. That had a great influence upon this senator and some others, in respect of prejudice against any kind of arbitration; just as we humble people who go to law, when the court has decided against us, from that time forth, until we recover our self-possession, are opposed to all courts.

Then there was another consideration. A large sentiment in the United States had been stringently and urgently excited by the Cubans (whoever they may be) to resist Spanish authority, which everybody knows is just as rightful an authority,—I am not speaking of the justice of its administration,—as we have over Alaska or any other part of the United States. And when we were trying to excite and maintain war in Cuba, and get it to a point where we should be justified upon public principles in recognizing a state of belligerency and then recognizing the independence of Cuba; when we were thus sympathizing and promoting and furnishing materials for war, it would be somewhat curious, at the same moment, to be preaching peace and engaging in arbitration with Her Majesty's government. It would not look well.

And so you will perceive, ladies and gentlemen, that what is reported to have been a failure to carry this treaty by three or four votes, is not, after all, so discouraging. The Senate, while a perpetual body, changes its personnel with most extraordinary rapidity, although the term is for six years. I had not been there but very few years, one of the youngest members in age, when out of the fifty or sixty senators then representing the states that had remained true to the Union, more than half had disappeared off the scene; and I had not been there fifteen years before I was the oldest senator in continuous service who remained. Thus the fact that this treaty has now failed ought not to discourage us in the least. On the contrary, I believe that when the stress in Europe is over, and when the sentiment, which is almost instinctive with Americans, that Her Majesty's government proposed to enter into it just then for reasons not altogether of the largest in the Christian sense, has gone by, negotiations will again be reopened, under better conditions and a more favorable conjunction of circumstances, and on a somewhat wider basis than that of the treaty which has failed, and that many of us,—I hope all of us,—may live to see the first great step, that step which costs and counts, in the attainment of peace and justice among nations as well as among men. (Applause.)

ADDRESS OF REV. E. E. HALE, D.D.

I am highly honored in being permitted to take what is the very enviable position of the first speaker on such an occasion. I am sure we all rejoice in the strong, intelligent and hopeful statement of our chairman. I hope

everybody came here in that mood; certainly I did, and I am quite sure that everybody will go away in good spirits.

The advance since last year has been very great. We rose a great deal higher than anybody expected to. Then we had a pretty bad fall, but we have not fallen nearly as low as we were then. This country understands that there is such a question. This country understands, and let me say this convention understands, the language in which we are to speak a great deal better than we did then. We shall not have, I think, in this meeting, what I have a right to call the somewhat vague and spongy use of words which we have had in the two sessions before. We know much better what we are after than we knew then, and the great word which the chairman used just now,—that we have come for much wider business than we ever knew we had come for before,—is a word which I hope will linger with us through the whole of these proceedings.

The truth is, that the whole business of "Diplomacy" is at stake, as has been suggested here, as has been hinted in print. We ought to remember that diplomats by profession, the men who are in bureaus at home or on embassies abroad, are not precisely the people to tell us whether a much broader and nobler foundation shall be established for the intercourse of Christian nations than that on which they have been twitching and pulling and fixing and fussing for two hundred and fifty years. You do not go to a physician of one school to ask him how a physician of another school is to extend the work of that school and to annihilate School Number One; and the diplomatists are not exactly the people who are to be consulted as to the great measure which, in less than a century, will put an end substantially to the methods of "Diplomacy." And when we are told that Lord This or the Marquis of That thinks this is a fad of modern times and will die out, we shall say, "We did not come to ask your opinion. We are going to take the opinion of the civilized and intelligent men of business, men of action, men of thought, men of prayer, of the world." (Applause.)

I wish we might remember, and I wish the gentlemen of the press would find out that this whole business of ambassadors and ministers and envoys and *chargés d'affaires* and Heaven knows what not, is all two hundred and forty-nine years old, and only that. It came into existence with the Treaty of Westphalia, as it will begin to go out of existence with the treaty for which we are here to lay the foundations. Under the present system, when two countries find out that they are countries, when a nation comes to a sense of independence, it looks round and says, "Where can we send some ministers?" I will not say that it is found convenient sometimes to send abroad for four years a gentleman who is very popular at home, though that thing has happened. I will only say that from the love of courts, the love of grand ceremony, and the rest, it is perfectly natural that a young nation like ours should desire to establish itself as being as good as anybody;—quite as a rich Californian when he goes to Paris wants to have as fine carriages and as fine horses as the dukes and the rest who are in Paris. That is all very nice; and so it happens that in every court in the world, the court at Washington included, there is a little cluster of gentlemen, most of them with nothing under the heavens to do but to dress for evening parties, and that to these gentlemen is con-